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EXTINGUISHING SMOKING
IN THE WORKPLACE
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the health danger of passive smoking' has become a
major public concern.2 New scientific evidence3 on the adverse effects
of tobacco smoke has sparked an aggressive war between smokers and
nonsmokers.4 Initially, the thrust of scientific research dealt only with
the impact of cigarette smoking on smokers.5 Consequently, non-
smokers had scant evidence to support their claims of the adverse effect
1. The Surgeon General has defined passive smoking (also referred to as involuntary
smoking) as the inhalation of environmental tobacco smoke by nonsmokers. U.S.
DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOL-
UNTARY SMOKING, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 21 (1986) [hereinafter
1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICES, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SUR-
GEON GENERAL 14 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
2. See Comment, The Rights of Nonsmokers in Tennessee, 54 TENN. L. REV. 671,
671 (1987) (discussing the emergence of the nonsmokers' legal rights under Tennessee
law).
3. The 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT first officially declared smoking to be a
health hazard of sufficient importance to warrant remedial action. U.S. DEP'T. OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A RE-
PORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL (1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S RE-
PORT]. Since then, published articles linking cigarette smoking to serious illness
increased from 6,000 published articles in 1964 to 30,000 in 1979. O'Kene, Toward a
Smoke-Free Society, 74 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1198, 1201 (1984). For comprehensive
scientific reports on the adverse effects of tobacco smoke, see 1986 SURGEON GEN-
ERAL'S REPORT and 1989 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1.
4. See Crocker, Controlling Smoking in the Workplace, 38 LAB. L. J. 739, 740
(1987) (discussing the pressure nonsmokers exert over employers to restrict smoking in
the workplace).
5. See generally 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1.
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of secondary smoke.6 The 1986 Surgeon General's report marked a
turning point in the controversy by arming the nonsmokers with solid
evidence that secondary smoke exposes them to greater amounts of
carcinogens than those to which the smoker is exposed.' Particularly,
the Surgeon General found that nonsmokers in the workplace face seri-
ous harm from exposure to tobacco smoke because they spend rela-
tively large amounts of time in contact with smokers.'
Smokers and nonsmokers have necessarily cast the employer into the
middle of their debate over smoking restrictions in the workplace.9
Recently there has been a trend among employers toward increasing
the prevalence ° and restrictiveness11 of smoking policies. Such
changes are motivated by the costs associated with employees who
6. Secondary smoke (also referred to as sidestream smoke) is the aerosol that comes
from the burning end of the cigarette between puffs. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 23. Primary smoke, or mainstream smoke, is the complex mix-
ture of smoke inhaled by the smoker from the mouthpiece of a cigarette. Id.
7. Id. The REPORT states that the combustion conditions which produce
sidestream smoke result in the generation of larger amounts of toxic and carcinogenic
agents than conditions which produce mainstream smoke. Id. at 21. The report quotes
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop:
[Ihe 1986 report is clearly the strongest and most well-documented health case
for smoke-free indoor air policies to date.... The right of the smoker to smoke
stops at the point where his or her smoking increases the disease risk in those
occupying the same environment.
Id. See Federal Clout Behind Nonsmokers, SMOKING POLICY INSTITUTE REPORT I
(1987).
8. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 284-86. According to the
REPORT, urban adults spend more time at work than at any other location except home.
Id. at 284. For adults living in a household where no one smokes, the workplace is the
greatest source of smoke exposure. Id. Consequently, an individual's smoke exposure
from work can be substantial in duration and intensity. Id. Furthermore, the REPORT
notes that individuals have less choice about their smoke exposure at work than they do
in other places, such as restaurants or auditoriums. Id. at 284. See also infra note 96
(discussing the amplified effect of secondary smoke in asbestos environments at work).
9. Employers have tried to justify not adopting smoking policies by claiming that
there is an obligation to protect the rights of smokers. Ban Smoking at Work and Save
Money, Too, Washington Post, April 3, 1985, at B2, col. 1. Timothy Lowenberg, Gen-
eral Counsel for the Smoking Policy Institute, argues that smokers have the same rights
as nonsmokers. By common law, these rights include the right to a safe and healthful
workplace. T. Lowenberg, Remarks at the Smoking Policy Institute Forum (July 7,
1985) (available at the American Lung Association of Eastern Missouri).
10. See 1989 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 581-84 (citing Bureau
of National Affairs, Where There's Smoke: Problems and Policies Concerning Smoking
in the Workplace 30 (2d ed. 1987)). The Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) conducted a
survey comparing work site smoking policies in 1986 and 1987. In 1986 BNA reported
a 36% prevalence of workplace smoking policies; in 1987 the estimate was 54%. Fur-
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smoke,12 heightened public support," the aggressiveness of non-
smokers in asserting their rights to a smoke-free environment 4 and the
increase in state and local legislation.15
This Note addresses the private employer's legal responsibility to re-
strict smoking in the workplace. The author will discuss common law
and statutory limitations placed upon an employer's ability to restrict
smoking in the workplace. Finally, this Note will review nonsmoking
legislation and offer suggestions on drafting more effective statutes.
II. THE EMPLOYER'S COMMON LAW DUTY TO PROVIDE A SAFE
AND HEALTHFUL WORKPLACE
Historically, courts have recognized that the employer has a contin-
uing affirmative duty to provide a safe and healthful work environ-
ment. 16 Nonsmoking employees have claimed that their employers
thermore, 85% of the companies with a smoking policy in 1987 reported that they had
adopted their policies from 1985 to 1987.
11. Id. According to the BNA surveys, the proportion of company smoking poli-
cies that stipulated a total ban on smoking in all company buildings doubled from 1986
to 1987. Id. at 583. The proportion of company policies that prohibited smoking in all
open work areas also increased from 41% in 1986 to 51% in 1987. Id.
12. Weiss, Can You Afford to Hire Smokers?, PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR, May,
1981, at 71. Smoking greatly impedes office efficiency and causes management grave
economic loss. Id. Estimates of on-the-job time lost to smoking rituals (i.e., lighting,
puffing, informal breaks) range from eight minutes per day to 15 to 30 minutes per
hour. Id. Smoking in the workplace also causes the employer economic losses from
absenteeism, mortality, insurance, employee morale and depreciation on furniture and
equipment. Id. See also Brief of Margaret Wells at 41, Margaret Wells, 51 INDUS.
ARB. 911 (1981) (Banzhaf, Arb.). The brief refers to a study by the medical department
at Dow Chemical Company reporting on the cost of smoking in the workplace. Id. The
study found that smoking employees took 5.5 sick days per year more than nonsmokers
and incurred significant excess wage costs per year. Id.
13. 1989 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 263-76 (documenting
trends in smoking behavior and reporting changes in the public's view toward smoking).
See Classen, Restricting the Right to Smoke in Public Areas: Whose Rights Should Be
Protected?, 38 SYRACusE L. REv. 831, 845 (1987) (discussing trends in public opinion
demanding a smoke-free environment at work).
14. 1989 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 436-45 (describing the
nature and objectives of antismoking advocacy and lobbying groups).
15. Id. at 556-86 (summarizing federal and state legislation restricting smoking in
public places and the workplace).
16. See, eg., Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Fitzpatrick v. Fowler,
168 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Decatur v. Charles H. Thompkins Co., 25 F.2d 526
(D.C. Cir. 1928); Green v. Pyne, 289 F. 929 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Gibson v. Gernat, 267 F.
305 (D.C. Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 487 (1920).
Federal and state occupational safety and health laws have codified an employer's
1990]
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have an affirmative duty to restrict smoking in the workplace. 17 Nev-
ertheless, Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company" is the only
case holding that the presence of tobacco smoke in the workplace is a
breach of this affirmative duty. In Shimp, the plaintiff sought a prohi-
bition on smoking at work because she was allergic to tobacco smoke.19
She alleged that her employer provided unsafe working conditions by
failing to ban smoking.2 ° The plaintiff presented affidavits from physi-
cians to document her extreme sensitivity to cigarette smoke,2 1 as well
as extensive scientific reports on the toxic nature of tobacco smoke to
smokers and nonsmokers.22 New Jersey Bell failed to present any evi-
dence in its defense.2" Finding the plaintiff's evidence clear and con-
vincing, the court held that although smokers have a right to smoke,
the right did not include the right to jeopardize the health of cowork-
ers.24 Thus, the court reasoned that the nonsmokers' rights included
general common law duty to provide a reasonably safe working environment for its
employees. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982). The federal statute provides no private
right of action for employees who seek to restrict workplace smoking. See Barrera v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 653 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1981); Federal Employees for
Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 598 F.2d
310, cert denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
17. See Smith v. Western Electric Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Shimp
v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976).
18. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
19. 145 N.J. Super. at 521, 368 A.2d at 409-10. The plaintiff's symptoms included
"nosebleeds, irritation to the eyes which resulted in corneal abrasion and corneal ero-
sion, headaches, nausea and vomiting." Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
20. Id. at 520, 368 A.2d at 409.
21.. Id. at 520-21, 368 A.2d at 410. Plaintiff sought relief through available griev-
ance procedures, which resulted in the installation of a fan in her work area. The plan
failed because the fan did not run continuously. Other employees complained of cold
drafts, and the resulting compromise, running the fan at set intervals, was also ineffec-
tive. Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
22. Id. at 527-30, 368 A.2d at 414-15. Thejudge gave extensive consideration to the
testimony and findings in affidavits and medical and scientific expert evidence on the
toxic effects of tobacco smoking and its consequences. Quoting the affidavit of Dr. Jesse
Steinfield, Professor of Medicine at the University of California and a member of the
American Association for Cancer Research, the court specifically pointed out that
"while the primary toxic effects of tobacco smoking occur in the individual who inhales
the mainstream smoke, it is quite clear that sidestream smoke contains a considerable
amount of material which is toxic to the passive smoker." Id. at 529, 368 A.2d at 414.
23. See Fox & Davidson, Smoking in the Workplace: Accommodating Diversity, 25
CAL. W. L. REV. 215, 225 (1989).
24. 145 N.J. Super. at 530-31, 368 A.2d at 415.
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the right to breathe air uncontaminated by cigarette smoke in the
workplace.25 New Jersey Bell's failure to present a defense was a key
determinant of the Shimp decision.26 Therefore, although Shimp rec-
ognized nonsmoker's rights, its unusual facts have prevented it from
establishing significant precedent.27
Despite Shimp, courts generally have been unwilling to recognize a
nonsmoker's legal right to a smoke-free environment. 28 For example,
Gordon v. Raven Systems & Research29 held that common law imposes
no duty on an employer to provide a smoke-free workplace. 0 In
Gordon the employer fired an employee when she refused to work in an
area containing tobacco smoke.31 The employee argued that there was
a common law duty. upon the employer to furnish a safe, smoke-free
workplace for an employee with special sensitivity to cigarette smoke. 2
While acknowledging the general duty of the employer to furnish his
employees with a reasonably safe workplace,3 3 the court held that com-
mon law does not impose upon employers the duty to conform their
workplace to the particular needs or sensitivities of an individual em-
ployee.34 Rather, the court only recognized a limited common law
duty to provide a safe working environment for average employees who
do not have an unusual sensitivity to smoke. In denying the employee
25. Id. at 530-31, 368 A.2d at 415. For additional commentary on Shimp, see Com-
ment, The Rights of Nonsmokers in Tennessee, 54 TENN. L. REv. 671, 676-79 (1987);
Paolella, The Legal Rights of Nonsmokers in the Workplace, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 591, 592-99 (1987); Classen, supra note 13, at 843-45.
26. Schein, Should Employers Restrict Smoking in the Workplace?, 38 LAB. L.J.,
173, 173-74 (1987).
27. Fox & Davidson, supra note 23, at 225. The result in Shimp might have been
different had New Jersey Bell contested the nonsmoker's claim. Id. Ms. Shimp's attor-
ney filed an identical case before the same judge on behalf of another employee. In the
case, New Jersey Bell put on a defense, and the judge dismissed the case. Id.
28. Id. at 227.
29. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id. at 11. The plaintiff specifically charged that the employer unlawfully re-
leased her and that he breached his common law duty to furnish a safe working environ-
ment. Id.
32. The plaintiff's "special sensitivity" when exposed to tobacco smoke consisted of
"severe symptoms of eye irritation, nasal congestion, chest tightness, nausea, and head-
aches." Id. at 14.
33. See supra note 16.
34. 462 A.2d at 15.
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injunctive relief, the court distinguished the case from Shimp.35 Unlike
the plaintiff in Shimp, the employee in Gordon failed to present enough
evidence on the deleterious effect of secondary smoke on all employees
to overcome the employer's defense.36
III. NONSMOKERS' STATUTORY CLAIMS
Nonsmokers are more likely to obtain relief under statutory claims
than under common law claims. For example, in Lapham v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd. of Review 7 the plaintiff employee's expo-
sure to secondary smoke at work caused her to develop bronchitis and
compelled her to resign." The court established a standard for the
plaintiff-employee to receive unemployment compensation after termi-
nation of her employment for health reasons: she must show that she
informed her employer of her medical condition and her inability to
perform regularly assigned duties.39 Further, she must substantiate
her condition with medical evidence. Once the plaintiff meets this bur-
den, the defendant-employer must provide a suitable alternative.' ° In
Lapham the plaintiff's evidence established the toxicity of tobacco
smoke and its harm to the health of smokers and nonsmokers.41 Satis-
fied with the plaintiff's evidence, the court held that the defendant
failed to provide a suitable alternative and granted the plaintiff unem-
ployment compensation benefits. 42
Nonsmokers have also successfully prevailed in seeking disability
benefits to cover smoke-related injuries.43 In Parodi v. Merit Systems
Protection Board and Office of Personnel Management 4 the court held
that a federal employee's allergic reaction to cigarette smoke consti-
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id. at 14-15. In distinguishing Shimp from Gordon, the court noted that the
Shimp court was willing to take judicial notice of the potential health hazards presented
by cigarette smoke. Id.
37. 103 Pa. Commw. 144, 519 A.2d 1101 (1987).
38. Id. at 145, 519 A.2d at 1101.
39. Id. at 146, 519 A.2d at 1102.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 147, 519 A.2d at 1102.
42. Id. at 148, 519 A.2d at 1103.
43. See Paolella, supra note 25, at 608-12 (discussing worker's compensation cover-
age of tobacco smoke harms).
44. 702 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1983).
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tuted an environmental disability45 entitling the employee to disability
benefits.' The employee claimed that the smoke-filled workplace
caused her to develop asthmatic bronchitis which eventually rendered
her unable to work.47 She sought disability benefits from the review
board"' which denied her relief.49 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the plaintiff was disabled 0 according to the federal disability stat-
ute.51 The court stated that an employee need not prove serious or
permanent physical injury to qualify for disability benefits; the statute
merely requires proof of an inability to perform the job because of dis-
ease or injury.52 The court further found that the plaintiff's eligibility
for disability payments depended on the review board's failure to offer
her more suitable employment.5 3
Although Parodi specifically sets case precedent for federal disability
suits,54 its general holding can be useful in supporting private claims by
nonsmokers for disability compensation. First, Parodi indicates judi-
cial recognition that tobacco smoke in the workplace can prevent
otherwise normal and productive employees from performing their
jobs.55 Second, upon becoming disabled, the employee may be entitled
45. Id. at 738.
46. Id. at 740.
47. 702 F.2d at 745. Finding the employee hypersensitive to cigarette smoke, the
agency's doctors concluded that her return to the same work environment would be
hazardous to her health. Id.
48. Id. The board reviews disability decisions made by the Office of Personnel Man-
agement. Id.
49. Id. The board accepted the doctor's recommendations but concluded that the
employee was not totally disabled. Id.
50. Id. at 751.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 8331(6) (1976). The statute qualifies an employee as totally disabled
if he is unable to perform "useful or efficient service in the grade or class of position last
occupied by the employee ... because of disease or injury." Id.
52. 690 F.2d at 750. In finding a prima facie case for disability benefits, the court
determined that the employee's claim was an environmental limitation (as opposed to
more common claims concerning physical or mental limitations). Id. The court held
that the statute implicitly included an employee with environmental limitations as qual-
ifying for disability benefits. Id.
53. Id. at 751. The court held that not only must a healthy work environment be
provided to the employee, but he must also be offered a position equivalent in "grade or
class." Id. The court gave the employer 60 days to offer the employee such a suitable
position. Id.
54. See Comment, Smokers vs. Nonsmokers, 48 Mo. L. REv. 783, 794 (1983).
55. See Paolella, supra note 25, at 627.
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to disability benefits. 6 Finally, the case establishes that the employer's
refusal to restrict smoking can be very costly to the employer if the
court grants the employee a disability pension award."7
IV. EMPLOYERS' STATUTORY DEFENSES
TO NONSMOKERS' CLAIMS
Employers are likely to rely on exclusive remedy provisions in state
workmen's compensation statutes to defend against the claims of non-
smokers.58 By their express terms, the exclusive remedy provisions im-
munize employers by barring employees from bringing civil actions for
personal injuries sustained during the course of business.59 Instead of
receiving damages from the employer directly the employee receives
his or her sole remedy from an administrative compensation fund.'
However, McCarthy v. Department of Social Health and Services6" es-
tablished a precedent for nonsmoker employees to seek damages from
their employers directly. In McCarthy the employee claimed that to-
bacco smoke in the workplace caused her to contract a pulmonary dis-
ease, forcing her to quit.62 As required by state law, she first submitted
a claim for benefits under the Washington Worker's Compensation
Act. 63 The reviewing board found her condition not compensable be-
cause the ailment did not qualify as either an injury" or occupational
disease65 as defined in the Act.66 The employee then filed a civil action
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 440, 530 (4th ed. 1971).
State workman's compensation statutes are designed to substitute for an action for dam-
ages, not to provide injunctive relief to prevent future injuries. Id.
59. See Paolella, supra note 25, at 603 (discussing employer immunity based on the
exclusive remedy provision of the Washington Workers' Compensation Act (WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 51.04.010-.98.080 (1985))); Comment, supra note 25, at 688-89 (1987)
(discussing the difficulty in applying Tennessee's Worker's Compensation Law (TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 50-6-101 to -401 (1983 & Supp. 1989)) to injuries caused by passive
inhalation of cigarette smoke).
60. See, eg., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 51.32.010 (1962 & Supp. 1989).
61. 46 Wash. App. 125, 730 P.2d 681 (1986).
62. Id. at 126-27, 730 P.2d at 683.
63. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 51.04.010-.98.080 (1985).
64. The Washington Workers' Compensation Act defines "injury" as "a sudden and
tangible happening, of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result,
and occurring from without, and such physical conditions as result therefrom." WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 51.08.100 (1963 & Supp. 1989).
65. The Washington Workers' Compensation Act defines "occupational disease" as
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against her employer. The Washington Court of Appeals held that the
employer had only qualified immunity.67 The court stated that the
Act's exclusive remedy provision barred private causes of action only
when the employee sustained harm within the coverage provisions of
the Act.6" Otherwise, the injured employee should be able to recover
from the employer.69 In states with similar worker's compensation
laws, the employer is unlikely to establish immunity for damages
caused by secondary smoke in the workplace because those statutes
will not cover such harms.7 °
In Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.7" the court found that the
exclusive remedy provision of the state worker's compensation statute
bars the common law action for damages but did not bar equitable
remedies.72 The court acknowledged that the statute was designed to
substitute for actions in damages only, not to provide injunctive relief
to prevent future injuries.7 3
a "disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of employment under the
mandatory or elective adoption provisions of this title." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 51.08.140 (1963 & Supp. 1989).
66. McCarthy v. Washington Dep't. Soc. & Health Serv., 1 I.E.R. 1233 (1986) (Al-
exander, Arb.). The Board determined that exposure to tobacco smoke at work caused
the employee's disabling lung disease. The disease was not a compensable injury be-
cause it was not sustained at a "definite time and place" as required by the Act. Her
harm was not a compensable occupational disease because the cigarette smoke in her
workplace was not "in excess of that found in other types of employment or in many
non-employment situations." Id. at 1235.
67. 46 Wash. App. at 133, 730 P.2d at 686. Qualified Immunity is the general rule
in the United States "where the [worker's compensation] act is inapplicable, the com-
mon-law and statutory remedies of the employee remain intact or are not barred." 101
C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 919 (1958).
68. 46 Wash. App. at 128, 730 P.2d at 684.
69. Id. at 129, 730 P.2d at 685. The court reasoned that it "would not be a just
result" to deprive the injured employee of a remedy merely because the Worker's Com-
pensation Act does not cover his injury. Id. at 133.
70. See supra note 62. See also Blumrosen, Ackerman, Kligerman, Van Schaik &
Sheehy, Injunctions Against Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work Under Safe Con-
ditions, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 702, 712-13 (1976) (discussing the purpose of workers com-
pensation laws and their limitations).
71. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). See supra
notes 16-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shimp.
72. 145 N.J. Super. at 525, 368 A.2d at 412.
73. Id. at 524, 368 A.2d at 411.
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V. NONSMOKERS' CLAIMS UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE
HANDICAP STATUTES
Federal and state rehabilitation statutes require certain employers to
accommodate handicapped persons. The non-smoker has qualified as a
"handicapped person"' under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of
197375 in order to obtain a smoke- free workplace.76 While the Act
does not cover private employers, it is useful to understand its applica-
tion because it is a model for most state rehabilitation statutes.77
Under the Act, employers must provide qualified handicapped individ-
uals with "reasonable accommodation" for their handicap. 78 Non-
smokers claim that their sensitivity to tobacco smoke qualifies them as
handicapped, thus entitling them to a prohibition on smoking in the
workplace as a "reasonable accommodation."
In Vickers v. Veterans Administration,79 the court found that a non-
smoking employee qualified as handicapped under the Federal Reha-
bilitation Act because of his unusual sensitivity to tobacco smoke
which "limited a major life activity" - his capacity to work in an
environment not completely smoke free.8° However, the court denied
the plaintiff injunctive relief, finding that the employer made a reason-
74. 29 C.F.R. 1613.702(b). The statute defines a "handicapped individual" as any
person who i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, ii) has a record of such impairment or iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment. Id.
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794a (1982).
76. See infra note 80 (noting cases which have qualified the nonsmoker as
handicapped).
77. See, e.g., Paolella, supra note 25, at 622-23 (1987) (comparing the Federal Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 with the Washington State Law Against Discrimination (WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (1985))).
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704. The statute requires that an agency must make reason-
able accommodation to the known physical limitations of a qualified handicapped em-
ployee unless the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on its program. Id.
79. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
80. Id. at 86-87. See also Pletten v. Dep't. of Army, 6 M.S.P.B. 626 (1981). The
court held that an employee who suffered from asthma induced by breathing tobacco
smoke was a handicapped person entitled to reasonable accommodation. Id. at 629. Cf
Federal Employees for Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F.Supp. 181 (D.D.C.
1978), aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979). The
court held that the Act did not apply to employees of federal agencies, but only to
handicapped persons receiving financial assistance from the federal government. Id. at
184. However, the court did not address whether a nonsmoker could ever be "handi-
capped" within the meaning of the Act. Id.
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able effort to accommodate the employee's handicap."1 The employer
satisfied his obligation by obtaining voluntary agreements not to
smoke, except in designated areas, from all of the employees in the
plaintiff's work area. 2 In addition, the employer installed ceiling
vents.
8 3
In GASP v. Mecklenberg County, 4 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals agreed that a employee sensitive to smoke could claim handi-
capped status.8 5 In GASP an anti-smoking association sued the county
on behalf of a class of all persons harmed by tobacco smoke present in
public facilities.8 6 The organization sought state and federal handi-
capped status for a class of persons with any type of pulmonary illness,
regardless of its severity. 7 Finding their class was too broad to fall
under either statute, the court denied handicapped status for the asso-
ciation.8 8 However, the court reserved judgment on whether a nar-
rower class of smoke-sensitive persons could qualify as handicapped. 9
VI. SMOKERS' RIGHTS CLAIMS
Few smoking employees have challenged their employer's decision
to alter smoking policies at work sites.9 However, in situations involv-
ing collective bargaining, a union may prevent an employer from
adopting a non-smoking policy. In Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Inter-
national Association of Machinists,9 1 the union successfully challenged
an asbestos manufacturer's attempt to implement a no smoking policy.
The manufacturer produced expert medical testimony that smoking
employees were ninety-two times more likely to die from lung cancer
81. 549 F. Supp. at 88.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 227, 256 S.E.2d at 478-79.
89. Id. See Classen, supra note 13, at 850-51. The author cautions that the handi-
cap claims made by nonsmokers could become a double-edged sword. Nonsmokers
who are handicapped by smoke-related ailments would have the right to a smoke-free
environment. However, at the same time, smokers who are handicapped because of
their "addiction" to smoking would have the right to smoke in their place of employ-
ment if the employer could accommodate them. Id.
90. Crocker, Controlling Smoking in the Workplace, 38 LAB. L.J. 739, 742 (1987).
91. 621 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980).
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than nonsmoking employees.92 Despite the evidence, the union dis-
puted the policy on grounds that it was too paternalistic and would
force heavy smokers to quit.93 In another arbitration case, Union Sani-
tary District,94 the arbitrator found an employer's total ban on smoking
unreasonable where the majority of workers found the secondhand
smoke negligible and unoffensive."
In addition to labor union challenges to employers' no-smoking poli-
cies, smokers might claim that such policies violate their constitutional
rights.9 6 Smokers have argued that smoking is an unenumerated right
protected by the right to privacy.97 However, the right to privacy only
includes enumerated fundamental personal liberties such as rights asso-
ciated with marriage and abortion.9" Thus, courts have not recognized
smoking as conforming to the conceptual pattern of cases which have
recognized the right of privacy.99
Smokers have also tried to attack no smoking policies by claiming
that they discriminate against the smoker as a "handicapped per-
92. Id. at 757. The expert also testified that secondary smoke damage is greatest
when exposure to secondary smoke and asbestos occur at the same time; therefore, in-
haling secondary smoke at work adds significantly to the carcinogenic risk. Id.
93. Id. The Union argued that confirmed chain smokers (Le., those smokers who
smoke three packs of cigarettes a day for thirty years) cannot stop smoking. Id. There-
fore, adopting a no smoking policy would inevitably cause their termination. Id. at 757-
58.
94. 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 193 (1982) (Koven, Arb.).
95. Id. at 194-95. But see Snap-On Tools Corp., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 785 (1986)
(Berman, Arb.). The arbitrator upheld a partial ban on smoking where the employer
has the right to unilaterally promulgate the rules when safety of the workplace was a
factor. Id. at 789.
96. See Comment, Where There's Smoke There's Ir" The Search for a Legal Path
to Tobacco-Free Air, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 62, 68-72 (1976) (discussing smokers'
rights). For arguments opposing antismoking legislation, see Merritt & Hill, Recent
Developments in Individual Rights, 18 URB. LAW. 935 (1986). The authors argue that
because we live in a free society, individuals should be able to engage in activities which
may adversely affect their health. Id. at 938. "It is not yet forbidden to follow a diet of
hamburgers and french fries, or to engage in sun bathing, both of which have demon-
strable adverse health effects."
97. The Constitution does not explicitly refer to the right of privacy, but the
Supreme Court has held that it is a "fundamental right" guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
98. See Comment, supra note 96, at 72. The right to smoke is not on the same level
as other rights which the right to privacy encompasses, such as the right of married
couples to use contraceptives (Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479) and the right of a woman to
choose to have an abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Id.
99. Id.
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son.'""c° No reported case has found smokers to be "handicapped,"
requiring the employer to make reasonable accommodation."01 To
qualify under the statutory definition of "handicapped," smokers
would have to demonstrate an addiction to the nicotine drug in tobacco
products.10 2 However, the Federal Rehabilitation Act has never quali-
fied "drug abusers" as handicapped."0 3 Like nonsmokers seeking
"handicapped" status, courts may also require smokers to show that
giving up their smoking at work would substantially impair a "major
life activity.""0 4
VII. NONSMOKING LEGISLATION
A. State Legislation
State governments are responsible for most nonsmoking legisla-
tion. 05 Since the early 1900s, states have exercised their police
power'0 6 to regulate tobacco smoke. 07 States have justified such re-
strictions by demonstrating a compelling interest 0 ' in protecting the
health of the general public."° The 1986 Surgeon General's report es-
100. See Classen, supra note 13, at 850.
101. SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 335 (1988).
102. Id. at 336.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 336-37. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of
nonsmokers' "handicapped" claims.
105. See Merritt & Hill, supra note 96, at 936-37 n.3 (providing a current list of all
state ordinances restricting smoking).
106. The state's police power allows the state to restrict the personal freedom and
property rights of individuals for the protection of public safety, health and morals and
for the promotion of public convenience as well as its general prosperity. However,
state and federal constitutions limit the scope of power. Marshall v. Kansas City, 355
S.W.2d 877, 883 (Mo. 1962); Alford v. City of Newport News, 260 S.E.2d 241 (Va.
1979). The Virginia Supreme Court held that ordinances restricting smoking in public
places are "clearly within the police power of the legislature." Id. at 243. See, eg., 61
AM. JUR. 2d, PLANT AND JOB SAFETY, § 132 (1981) (suggesting that black letter law
allows legislatures to impose reasonable regulations on employers for the protection and
comfort of its employees).
107. See Classen, supra note 13, at 852-54 (1987) (discussing the legality of state
legislation restricting smoking in public).
108. A state can only justify limiting fundamental rights such as privacy by showing
a compelling state interest. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965). See also
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17 (1978) (discussing the constitu-
tional basis for the right to privacy).
109. See 1989 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 204. The REPORT
extensively documents the threat smoking poses to society. Basically, smoking threat-
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tablished a strong foundation for the enactment of the statutes. States
legislators claim that an individual's personal autonomy may be re-
stricted when it threatens the well-being of society."' Therefore, the
state's authority to prevent an individual from smoking includes those
situations where secondary smoke"'. threatens the health of third
parties.' 12
Originally state legislatures justified restrictive smoking legislation as
necessary to protect the public from fire and other safety hazards, espe-
cially within the workplace."' Additionally, states felt a moral obliga-
tion to ban cigarette smoking, which was blamed for social evils."
4
During the 1960s, the health risks of smoking became widely recog-
nized, and the focus of legislation shifted toward encouraging the
smoker to quit. " 5 However, the metamorphosis in smoking legislation
ens society in two ways. First, tobacco smoke affects the smoker's own body. Scientific
evidence shows that it can cause cancer, heart and respiratory ailments and other dis-
eases. Id. at 204. Furthermore, smoking decreases productivity in the work force and
increases health care costs which detract from other social programs. Id. at 189, 287
and 401. Second, smoking affects those individuals who are exposed to secondary
smoke. Id. at 331. See supra notes I and 6.
110. See infra note 84. State laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets are
analogous to the laws restricting smoking. See Classen, supra note 13, at 853. Many
states require motorcyclists to wear helmets as a safety precaution. These statutes have
been challenged as irrelevant to public health and safety and as invading the operator's
right of privacy. See, eg., State v. Burzycki, 158 Conn. 632, 252 A.2d 312 (Conn. 1969)
(Connecticut helmet law held constitutional); Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 253
La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968) (Louisiana helmet law held constitutional); Common-
wealth v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied 393 U.S. 999 (1968)
(Massachusetts helmet law held constitutional). The judiciary has upheld the constitu-
tionality of helmet ordinances, finding that the failure to wear a helmet may contribute
to a motorcyclist losing control of his motorcycle and cause a multiple vehicle accident
which may injure other motorists. State v. Fetterly, 456 P.2d 996 (Or. 1969).
111. See Classen, supra note 13, at 854.
112. See also Merritt & Hill, supra note 96, at 939 (arguing that public ordinances
should also protect the rights of smokers by providing them with reasonable facilities
for smoking). But see Comment, Where There's Smoke There's Ire: The Search for a
Legal Path to Tobacco-Free Air, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 62, 68-74 (1976) (discussing
smokers rights and their challenges to state smoking statutes).
113. 1989 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 553. Until 1964, when
the Surgeon General issued the first report, 19 states prohibited smoking near explosives
or fireworks, in or near mines, or near hazardous fire areas. Id.
114. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 264-65. The Surgeon
General attributes the moral crusade against cigarette smoking to the moral crusade
against alcohol that emerged during the same time. The strong public reaction to alco-
hol prohibition in 1927 encouraged states to repeal their laws banning smoking. Id.
115. Id. at 265.
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began in the 1970s when extensive scientific studies reported the ad-
verse effects that smoking had on nonsmokers. To the chagrin of the
tobacco industry,' 16 the pace of legislation increased and the scope be-
came more restrictive.'
1 7
Minnesota passed its landmark Clean Indoor Air Act in 1975. 18
The most comprehensive at the time, the Act covered private work
sites, restaurants and certain public places. Within the next five years,
Utah,119 Montana' 20 and Nebraska 2' enacted similar comprehensive
legislation. Momentum continued to build into the 1980s, with
twenty-three new laws enacted by sixteen states between 1980 and
1985.122 As of 1989, forty-two states and the District of Columbia had
enacted laws regulating smoking.' 23 The remaining eight states which
have not taken legislative action to restrict smoking include Alabama,
Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and
Wyoming.'24 Because several of these states are heavily dependent on
the tobacco industry, the state legislatures are reluctant to pass non-
smoking legislation.1 25
The current wave of legislation has imposed new obligations on em-
ployers.' 26 The least restrictive workplace laws simply require the em-
116. See, eg., Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464
(1987). Representatives of the tobacco industry brought suit in an effort to defeat the
administrative rule prohibiting smoking in all public places in New York. They based
their claim on the argument that the Public Health Council did not have authority to
promulgate the rule. Id.
117. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 264-65. Between 1970
and 1974, eight states enacted smoking regulations. Between 1975 and 1979, 15 states
enacted smoking regulations. Id.
118. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 144.411-.417 (West 1989).
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
120. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50-40-101 (1986).
121. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5707 (1986).
122. 1989 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 561-68 (providing a table
on state laws restricting smoking from 1964-1987).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Doolan & Indeglia, A Call For Action: The Burning Issue, 5 J. OF CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL. 221, 236 (1989).
126. See Crocker, Controlling Smoking in the Workplace, 38 LAB. L.J. 739, 741
(1987) (assessing the impact of state legislation on employer's smoking policies);
Hehmann, Nonsmokers' and Smokers' Rights in the Workplace, EQu. EMPL. OPP. L.
1901 (1986).
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ployer to issue a written smoking policy and to post signs.12 7 More
restrictive laws require that employers designate nonsmoking areas,
implying that nonsmoking is the norm. 128
States with more restrictive smoking laws include New Jersey, New
Mexico and Rhode Island. 129 These state legislatures have set guide-
lines which a private employer must follow in establishing a smoking
policy. The New Mexico statute130 requires an absolute prohibition in
nurse's aid stations, elevators and a contiguous nonsmoking area of not
less than one-half of an office's seating capacity. The Rhode Island
statute131 requires an employer to take reasonable efforts to accommo-
date a nonsmoking employee affected by secondary smoke effects.
However, the statute does not require an employer to make any ex-
penditures or structural changes to accommodate the nonsmoking
employees. 132
State restrictive smoking laws vary in their provisions for implemen-
tation and enforcement.1 33 Nearly all states with nonsmoking laws
provide penalties for smokers who violate restrictions.1 34 In two states
violators may be jailed.' 35 Employers or others who fail to designate
smoking areas may be fined in nine states.1 36 In most states the health
department is responsible for policy enforcement.1 37 However, in real-
ity private organizations have been the most effective in implementing
127. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 268-73. The Report
presents a comprehensive table on state laws regulating smoking in public places and
worksites. The table illustrates that five states have adopted a written smoking policy
and ten states require the posting of signs. Id.
128. Id. at 273.
129. Doolan & Indeglia, supra note 125, at 240.
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-16-7 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
131. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20-7 (1989).
132. Id.
133. *Some Congressional members feel that no smoking laws are basically unen-
forceable codifications of good manners and common courtesy. N.Y. Times, June 15,
1975, at 48, col. 5.
134. See 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 243 (listing of state
statutes imposing penalties on violators).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 565. Minnesota and Utah grant the state health agencies authority to
enforce smoking restrictions in the workplace if the agencies determine that the level of
sidestream smoke in the office is detrimental to the health and comfort of nonsmoking
employees. Doolan & Indeglia, supra note 131, at 236.
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the laws. 138 Nonsmokers' Rights Organization, state and local chap-
ters of the American Lung Association, and other health-oriented
groups have proven the most active in making employers aware of their
responsibility under the laws.1
39
While private organizations facilitate compliance, the laws them-
selves encourage individual initiative in resolving tobacco smoke
problems.1" The laws give aggrieved non-smokers assurances that
they have a legal right to a remedy by providing a basis for their com-
plaint. Because the specific statutory provisions establish guidelines141
to fashion smoking policies and resolve disputes, there is less of a need
to resort to litigation.
B. Local Legislation
Municipalities, like states, have discretion to use their police power
to preserve public health, safety and morals or to abate public nui-
sances.' 42 In the 1980s, smoking legislation shifted from the state
138. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 571. Neither the ade-
quacy of implementation nor the level of compliance has been well studied. Id Ac-
cording to an evaluation on the implementation of Minnesota's smoking statute, the
state's department of health receives and resolves approximately 100 complaints per
month. Edward R. Brandt, President of the Association for Non-Smokers' Rights, tes-
timony before the Wisconsin Assembly Committee on State Affairs on Assembly Bill 80
(March 20, 1979). The private groups, however, have been particularly effective both in
making proprietors and employers aware of their responsibilities under the law and in
the production and distribution of signs and visual materials. Id.
139. See 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 440-42 (describing
antismoking advocacy and lobbying groups and discussing their contribution to imple-
menting smoking restrictions).
140. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-417. The emphasis of implementing
the Minnesota statute has been on voluntary action rather than on using the power of
the state to compel compliance and penalize non-compliance. Testimony of Edward B.
Brandt before the Wisconsin Assembly Committee on State Affairs (March 20, 1979).
141. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-.417 (Minnesota's statute has estab-
lished a sign requirement as part of its general duty to implement the Minnesota stat-
ute); MINN. R. 4620.0500 (1989) (requirements for placement and content of "no
smoking" signs); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21b(b)(B) (West 1988) (Connecticut's
statute requires that each sign bear the statement "No Smoking" in letters at least four
inches high and the statements "or carrying a lighted cigarette, pipe or cigar," "by act
of Congress" and "report violations to. . ." in letters one-half of an inch high); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.01(c) (Vernon 1989) (signs are required to be placed at the
entrance to no-smoking areas to give adequate notice to the smoker and within the
smoking restricted area in clearly visible places. The statute also requires that ash trays
be placed at the entrance of every place where smoking is prohibited).
142. See generally Annotation, Constitutionality of Anti-Cigarette Legislation, 20
A.L.R. 926, 931-32 (1922).
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level to the local level. 143 Many local ordinances provide for smoking
restrictions in the workplace where the state law does not apply. For
example, although California does not restrict smoking in the work-
place, sixty-six of its cities and counties have passed smoking ordi-
nances requiring private employers to have a smoking policy or to
identify nonsmoking areas. 1" In 1985 San Francisco passed the most
restrictive law of any major U.S. city,145 requiring that employers who
permit employees to smoke in the work area must accommodate the
preferences of smoking and nonsmoking employees. Employers face
fines if they cannot find acceptable solutions for nonsmoker
complaints. 146
C. Federal Legislation
Congress has enacted scant federal legislation restricting smoking in
the private workplace.147 However, the "General Duty" clause of the
Occupational Safety and Health Acts of 1970 (OSH Act)14 imposes a
general duty upon the public and private employer to eliminate all
foreseeable and preventable hazards which are capable of causing death
or serious physical harm.149 However, courts have hesitated to find
that secondary smoke qualifies as such a hazard.150 The OSH Act does
not establish any standard concerning tobacco smoke nor does it grant
143. See Warner, Regional Differences in State Legislation on Cigarette Smoking, 56
TEX. Bus. REv. 27 (1982).
144. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 566. The Report notes
that the 117 local ordinances affect nearly 15 million citizens, more than 55% of the
state's population.
145. San Francisco Anti-Smoking Law a Success, Wall St. J., June 25, 1985, at BI,
col. 5. The article discusses the heated battle over enacting the ordinance. It reports
that a pro-smoking group collected over 48 signatures in opposition to the bill, and the
tobacco industry contributed more than $1.2 million to the committee's campaign. Id.
146. Id.
147. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 553. The federal govern-
ment has taken steps to restrict smoking in two categories of public places: transporta-
tion facilities (32 C.F.R. 203 (1983)) and government worksites (49 C.F.R. § 1061
(1983)). See also Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers and Nonsmokers: The
Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REv. 444, 460 (1980) (discussing
the advantages and disadvantages of enacting federal legislation restricting smoking).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1988).
149. Id.
150. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that OSHA regu-
lations apply to both the federal and private sector). See, e.g., Gasper v. Louisiana
Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 1276
(5th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979); Federal Employees for Non-Smok-
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nonsmokers a private cause of action. 51 For example, in Federal Em-
ployees for Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States,'52 nonsmoking federal
employees sought injunctive relief to restrict smoking to designated ar-
eas. The court held that while the OSH Act requires federal agencies
to provide a safe and healthful working environment, it does not pro-
vide employees with a private cause of action against federal employ-
ers.1 5 Furthermore, courts have held that OSH Act does not preempt
the field of occupational safety and that states have concurrent power
to act under common law. 154
Congress has been most responsive to claims of nonsmokers in the
context of airline travel.' 55 In 1990, Congress passed an amendment
which bans smoking on all airline flights under six hours.1 56 Both the
growing awareness of the hazards of secondary smoke and the concern
for airline safety prompted such action.' 57
VIII. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Because of increasing scientific and judicial recognition of the ad-
verse effects of secondary smoke, nonsmokers' concerns have prevailed
over those of smokers in the workplace. 5 Without any specific legal
guidance, employers cannot know the extent to which they can accom-
modate one group without facing litigation by the other. Therefore,
state and local legislation is needed to guide the employer in establish-
ing a viable smoking policy. Carefully drafted legislation can protect
ers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
151. Id. See also Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d
408 (1976).
152. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 926 (1979).
153. Id.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4)(1988). The statute states that nothing in the Act "shall
be construed to supercede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or
to enlarge, or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory
rights, duties or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to
injuries, diseases or death of employee arising out of, or in the course of employment."
Id.
155. See Doolan & Indeglia, supra note 125, at 234.
156. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-161, § 335, 103 Stat. 1069, 1098-99 (1989).
157. See Doolan & Indeglia, supra note 125, at 234.
158. Id. at 240.
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the rights of both smokers and nonsmokers and can prevent future
conflicts between the groups. Ideally, legislation should establish non-
smoking as the norm. Additionally, it should specify implementation
and enforcement methods and penalties for violations.159
Because secondary smoke can seriously affect the nonsmoker, public
policy should require a presumption that nonsmoking is the norm,
while allowing specified smoking areas.160 The Minnesota statute best
serves as a model for other restrictive smoking statutes. 161 It requires
the Department of Labor and Industry to establish rules restricting or
prohibiting smoking in those places of work where the close proximity
of workers or the inadequacy of ventilation causes smoke pollution to
hinder the health and comfort of non-smoking employees.162 The stat-
ute also provides an exception for enclosed offices occupied exclusively
by smokers. 163 Without this provision, a law prohibiting smoking in
the workplace could have the unintended effect of prohibiting smoking
in a truly private office. 1" Wisconsin's Clean Indoor Act 165 is another
exemplary statute. 166 While the statute bans smoking in all offices, it
also provides for the designation of smoking areas in order to accom-
modate the interests of all employees.167 A less restrictive statute
could merely require erecting physical barriers or installing ventilation
systems to minimize the toxic effect of smoking in nearby areas. 161
However, business experience has shown deficiencies in these solutions;
physical barriers are expensive and ventilation systems are often
inadequate. 169
Legislators may have difficulty drafting legislation to cover the wide
159. See Comment, supra note 147, at 449-59 (comparing state legislation restrict-
ing smoking in the workplace).
160. See Doolan & Indeglia, supra note 125, at 242.
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. Section 144.411-417.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Comment, supra note 147, at 453.
165. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.123 (West 1988).
166. See Doolan & Indeglia supra note 125, at 242.
167. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.123.
168. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5708 (1986).
169. See American Lung Association of Eastern Missouri Brochure, Smoking and
Smoking Policies Development, Jan. 23, 1985. See also supra note 21 (noting the ineffec-
tiveness of a fan in eliminating tobacco smoke).
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variation in the size, shape and nature of workplaces. 170 Therefore,
they may delegate administrative agencies the authority to implement
and enforce guidelines. In Minnesota, for example, the statute charges
the State Commissioner of Health with the responsibility of adopting
regulations to implement the statute. I7 1 Additionally, the Commis-
sioner, a local board of health and any affected party have authority to
institute injunctive action.172
Optimal legislation should encourage smokers to comply with the
regulations by requiring the employer to post no smoking signs. 173 The
signs serve to delineate the specific area where the employer prohibits
smoking, and they remind smokers to extinguish their cigarettes. Fur-
thermore, signs also provide a statutory basis for prosecuting
violations. 74
In addition, an effective statute should impose realistic penalties
rather than nominal fines. The statute should penalize not only the
smoker but also the employer for breach of his duty to protect non-
smokers. To justify punishment at this level, the statute must first im-
poge a duty on the employer.'17 For example, the Minnesota Statute 176
states that the employer must make reasonable efforts to prevent smok-
ing by: (1) posting no smoking signs; (2) arranging separate smoking
and nonsmoking areas; (3) requesting smokers violating the law to
cease; or (4) by other appropriate means. 177 If the employer breaches
this duty, the statute may impose a five hundred dollar fine. 178 Such a
large penalty provides the employer with a strong incentive to comply
with the regulations.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although both employers and society have an interest in allowing
170. See Comment, supra note 96, at 94 (evaluating the scope of protection to non-
smokers in state legislation).
171. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.411-.41713 (West Supp. 1989).
172. Id.
173. See supra note 140 (noting that the Minnesota Statute aims to achieve volun-
tary compliance).
174. See supra note 141.
175. See Comment, supra note 147, at 457 (discussing the range of penalties im-
posed by statutes).
176. See supra note 161.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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smokers to satisfy their indulgences, they are also concerned with pro-
tecting the freedom and health of nonsmokers. Therefore, effective
protection of the nonsmoker's welfare demands legislative action. To
achieve this end, statutes should guide the employer in reaching an
equitable smoking policy to appease the tension between smokers and
nonsmokers.
Nancy Kornblum*
* J.D. 1990, Washington University
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